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Abstract
The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to exploit patents on their federally sponsored re-
search. University laboratories therefore have two sources of funds: direct grants from
sponsors and income from licensing. Tax credits for private R&D also contribute, because
they increase the protability of licensing. Because Bayh-Dole prots are a source of funds,
the question arises how subsidies and Bayh-Dole prots t together. I show that subsidies
to the university can either "prime the pump" for spending out of Bayh-Dole funds, or can
crowd it out. Because of crowding out, if the sponsor wants to increase university spending
beyond the universitys own target, it will end up funding the entire research bill, just as if
there were no prot opportunities under the Bayh-Dole Act. A subsidy system that requires
university matching can mitigate this problem.
JEL Classications: O34, K00, L00
Keywords: research subsidy, tax credits, Bayh-Dole Act, matching grants, crowding out
1 Introduction
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 authorized universities to own and license the patents that
result from federally sponsored research. The primary hope was that universities would try
to make their work useful in the economy. However, a secondary hope might have been
that it would relieve nancial pressure on universitiesresearch budgets, and ultimately on
federal sponsors. The question in this paper is whether that could work.
I propose a concrete model of the research process that allows me to assess (1) the
role of research subsidies when universities earn prots under the Bayh-Dole Act, and (2)
the economic rationale, if any, for the Act. One of the key questions is whether research
subsidies actually increase research expenditures, or whether they simply crowd out Bayh-
Dole prots.
To address these questions, I need a model of research that distinguishes the type of
research done in universities from the more applied research required to create a marketable
innovation. A widely held view is that the proper distinction has something to do with the
level of abstraction, or "basicness." I propose that there are two distinct research activities:
the activity of turning up abstractions (ideas, understood as investment opportunities),
and the activity of turning the investment opportunities into innovations. I thus follow
ODonoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), Scotchmer (1999), Erkal and Scotchmer (2007,
2009) in distinguishing between investment opportunities, which are scarce, and the invest-
ments or innovations themselves.
In this stylization, the costs borne by the university and costs borne by rms have
di¤erent natures. The university bears a ow cost of doing research, and the ow cost turns
up a series of random investment opportunities (abstract ideas). A higher ow cost of R&D
leads to a higher ow of ideas. In contrast, the R&D costs borne by rms are targeted to
the implementation of particular investment ideas.
The Bayh-Dole Act only has force if the knowledge turned up in universities is patentable.
However, a tension at the heart of this paper is that ideas or abstractions are generally not
patentable.
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The patent-ineligibility of abstract ideas was a¢ rmed in 2008 by the U.S. Supreme Court
in the informative case, Bilski. Bilskis patent application was on a business method that
allows home owners to smooth their heating bills and thus hedge against the risk of bad
weather or uctuations in price. The application had been rejected by the Federal Circuit
as not satisfying their machine-or-transformation test. The Supreme Court held that the
machine-or-transformation test is not dispositive, but, citing their previous opinions, still
rejected the patent application as an attempt to patent an abstract idea.
In fact, much of the knowledge turned up in universities would not pass the Federal
Circuits machine-or-transformation test for patentability, and could easily be categorized
as "abstractions." If so, the Bayh-Dole Act has no e¤ect. Perhaps because of this, university
licensing o¢ ces have been much less lucrative than was hoped. Licensing revenue provides
less than 5% of universitiesresearch budgets (see Thursby and Thursby, 2003, and Mowery
et al, 2004), and there are only a handful of protable licensing o¢ ces. Most are deeply in
the red.
Part of my inquiry is whether the Bayh-dole Act was a good idea, and if so, whether
patent law should be more accommodating of "abstractions." That is, should the ideas
produced in universities be patentable? I take this as a policy question.
I make a distinction between intellectual property rights on the "idea" and intellectual
property rights on the innovation that results from it. Patent law is friendlier to patents on
commercial products than to patents on ideas or abstractions, as we have just seen. If the
idea is protected, and becomes a protable innovation, the commercial rm that develops
the idea does not need an additional patent. However, if the idea cannot be patented, a
patent on the commercial innovation is necessary. Without it, a prot-motivated rm would
not invest.
If the idea is protected, then it can be auctioned exclusively to a commercializing rm,
and the university will collect the prot. If the idea is not protected, the university cannot
auction the exclusive use of it. Because university researchers publish, the idea will enter
the public domain, and there may be a patent race for the innovation. The patent race will
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dissipate prot. Even though the winner of the patent race will have a protected innovation,
the rms in the patent race make zero prot in expectation, and the university gets nothing.
Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act will only generate prot for the university if ideas are patentable.
Assuming then that ideas are patentable, one of my main questions is whether the
Bayh-Dole Act relieves the pressure on sponsors to subsidize research. This is relevant if
the university can nd ways to "tax" the Bayh-Dole prot for other purposes. If so, the
subsidies might do nothing more than crowd out the use of Bayh-Dole funds. To increase the
universitys research spending, sponsors would have to pay the entire research bill, so that
further crowding out is impossible. Crowding out puts the sponsors in the same funding
position as if there were no Bayh-Dole Act.
Whether there is crowding out depends both on the universitys preferences and on its
exibility in revising the internal levy in response to subsidies. If the universitys levy on
Bayh-Dole prots is xed when the subsidy is announced, the subsidy "primes the pump"
and increases the universitys spending on research. In contrast, if the levy can be adjusted
to the subsidy, then the subsidy can "crowd out" the Bayh-Dole prots, without increasing
the research spending at all.
A direct instrument to limit the problem of crowding out is to provide subsidies on
a matching basis. The sponsor can simply require that the university provides a specied
share of the research budget. I investigate whether the sponsor can then achieve the e¢ cient
level of R&D spending while also making sure that Bayh-Dole prots are returned to the
research process.
Crowding out seems to be a perverse consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act that has not
previously been studied, either theoretically or empirically. The empirical studies fall into
several broad approaches, those that investigate whether the Bayh-Dole Act changed the
size or quality of university patent portfolios (Henderson, et al, 1998, Mowery and Ziedonis,
2002, Sampat, Mowery and Ziedonis, 2003), one that investigates whether the Bayh-Dole
Act changed the type of research that is funded (Ra¤erty, 2008), and several that focus
on the incentives of scientists (Azoulay et al, 2009, Thursby and Thursby, 2011, Lach and
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Schankerman, 2008). The theoretical studies are mostly concerned with the incentives
of scientists (Thursby et al, 2007, Gans and Murray, 2011, Aghion et al, 2008, Banal-
Estañol and Macho-Stadler, 2010, Jensen, et al, 2010). Overall, the empirical studies do
not support the notion that basic research declined with the enactment of the Bayh-Dole
Act. However, this does not mean that scientists are immune to incentives. Lach and
Schankerman (2008) discover that universities earn higher licensing revenue when they pay
higher royalty shares to their scientists. The surprise is that these incentives may lead to
more scientic publication rather than less. Azoulay et al (2009) discover that patenting
and academic publication go hand in hand.
This paper takes a di¤erent approach, in that it focusses on the incentives of the uni-
versity rather than of the scientists. The university may view the research division as a
convenient source of revenue, and may want to tax the prots. It is the universitys desire
to tax the researchers that can lead to crowding out.
The prot-sharing within the university is generally hard to gure out. Lach and
Schankerman (2008) shed some light on the question by investigating how much prot
is given to researchers. The portion assigned to the researcher varies considerably among
universities, between 21% and 65%. When the rate is nonlinear (decreasing with income)
the spread is wider. Admittedly, these data can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. It seems
natural to interpret the researchers portion as part of his or her salary in expectation, but
that does not resolve it. The salary can be understood as an obligation of the general fund.
What is hard to gure out is how much of the prot comes back to the research division to
funds laboratories. In any case, the data show that prot sharing is an essential part of the
Bayh-Dole ecology.
Section 2 presents a model of idea generation and development. Section 3 characterizes
the optimal innovation policy when ideas are protectable, and the universitys tax on prot
from commercialization is set before the subsidies are chosen. Section 4 addresses the reverse
timing, where the subsidy is set before the universitys tax. In section 5, I investigate the
improvement when subsidies require some kind of matching. Section 6 explains why it
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might be e¢ cient to allow patenting of ideas instead of (only) their commercial reications,
despite crowding out. That is, the Bayh-Dole Act is not as misguided as some commentators
believe. In section 6 I comment on notions of basic research, and how this model relates to
them.
2 A model
There are two types of research: university research that produces a stream of ideas that
could become innovations, and commercial research that develops ideas into innovations.
An idea is represented by a pair of parameters (v; c) ; where v measures its per period social
value and c measures the cost that must be invested.1 Following Scotchmer (1999), each
idea is drawn from a distribution F; with density f; where f (v; c) is the density. Figure 1
shows a space of ideas (v; c) ; with cost on the vertical axis and per-period social value v
on the horizontal axis. The value v is the per-period social value if the good is supplied
competitively, with total discounted social value v=r.
In this paper I take as a premise that the development of ideas is left to the private
sector. However, if ideas were perfectly observable to public sponsors, or if sponsors could
elicit the parameters (v; c) of an idea with some cleverly designed mechanism, then patents
should be avoided at that stage as well. The better mechanism would be to elicit the
information, decide which ideas (v; c) to invest in, and then pay the cost of investment
from e¢ ciently collected public funds. However, when ideas are private, there is no obvious
mechanism to elicit the information (v; c). My (1999) paper promotes the idea that patents
can only be optimal if the values of ideas are not observable to sponsors. That is also the
point of view taken here.2
I rst discuss the model of developing ideas, and then discuss the ideas process in more
1The focus in this paper is on the idea generation process, not on the more standard problem of how
to elicit R&D investments when the investment opportunity is already known. Thus I have chosen a very
simply cost structure for the innovation. One could obviously change the strcuture to involve moral hazard
or other problems which would have implications for how to structure the reward.
2This condition can be understood as not very restrictive. If two or more rms can observe the value of
an idea, then they have perfectly correlated information, and there are zero-cost mechanisms to make them
announce it.
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Figure 1: Policy toward commercializations, where  = T1 
detail. For the main points of this paper, the details in section 2.1 are mostly unnecessary.
What is necessary is to realize that there are policy instruments summarized in a parameter
 such that prot is increasing in ; and there is an optimal (nite) reward structure, .
The parameter  reects the patent life and tax credits.
One reason to be explicit about the model of development incentives is to emphasize
that tax credits might be an optimal complement to the patent policy. Tax credits will
encourage investment in ideas that would otherwise be marginal, while creating windfall
prots on ideas that would be protable anyway. But that is also true of the patent life.
Increasing the patent life will encourage investments at the margin, while creating windfall
prots for already protable investments. As a policy instrument for generating prot,
the patent life has an obvious defect  it creates deadweight loss. Unless there is some
administrative loss (which I assume below), tax credits are just a transfer from taxpayers
to innovators. Unless the administrative loss is large, tax credits are attractive.
2.1 Developing ideas
The two policy instruments at the development stage are a patent life T; which is interpreted
as discounted,3 and a tax credit  2 [0; 1] ; which allows the government to share the cost
of commercialization. If  is the percentage of consumer value that the proprietor collects
3 If T^ is the patent life measured in undiscounted years, then T =
R T^
0
e rtdt is the dicounted patent life.
Its minimum is 0, achieved when the undiscounted patent life is 0, and its maximum is 1=r; achieved with
the undicounted patent life is innite.
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as prot in each time period, an idea (v; c) is protable when
Tv   (1  ) c  0
T
(1  )v   c  0 (1)
Let  represent the protability of the private incentive system, dened as
 :=
T
(1  )
where (T; ) are the policy variables. In gure 1, only the ideas (v; c) under the line v will
be developed.
If the protability satises  = 1=r; then all ideas with cost below the v=r threshold in
gure 1 will be developed. This would be optimal if it were costless to raise funds through
either a patent life or a tax subsidy. However, such high rewards are not optimal if the
patent life imposes deadweight loss or if there are ine¢ ciencies due to the tax subsidy. The
deadweight loss due to the patent can be mitigated, while preserving the protability ; by
shortening the patent life and giving a larger tax credit.
However tax credits may also be ine¢ cient. I shall assume that for every project that
is subsidized at rate  , there is a waste K (), where the function K is convex, increasing,
and K (0) = K 0 (0) = 0: I assume that the waste is not a pure transfer, but rather that at
least part of it is social waste due to ine¢ cient actions.
For each level of protability ; there is an optimal combination of patent life and tax
subidy (T () ;  ()) which maximize the expected consumer value of commercializing the
ideas below the line in gure 1 dened by v:We shall let  () represent the expected social
value of these commercializations:
 () = max
T; j= T
(1 )

Z 1
0
Z v
0
[v=r   dTv   c K ()] f (c; v) dcdv (2)
=
Z 1
0
Z v
0
[v=r   dT () v   c K ( ())] f (c; v) dcdv
where d is the fraction of social value that is lost as deadweight loss in each period.
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The optimal (T () ;  ()) have the property that an increase in patent life would increase
deadweight loss by the same amount as the e¢ ciency loss in boosting the tax subsidy enough
to achieve the same increase in : The optimal patent life is not zero, and if K 0 (0) = 0; the
optimal tax credit  is also positive.
Let  be the reward that maximizes  () : This optimum has the property illuminated
by Nordhaus (1969) that while an increase in  would increase commercializations, it also
creates windfall prot on inframarginal innovations through either a longer patent life or
more tax subsidies, and these create social costs that just o¤set the social value of supporting
more commercializations.
Assuming that ideas are commercialized whenever protable, write () for their per-
period protability on average, taking account of the fact that not all are commercialized.
The expected prot of a random idea is
() 
Z
f(v;c):cvg
[vT ()  (1  ) c] dF (c; v)
The functions  is increasing. A higher value of  makes each idea more protable, and
also increases the fraction of ideas that will be commercialized.
2.2 The ideas process
I stressed in the introduction that the nature of costs is di¤erent for commercializations
than for generating ideas. The research costs of commercialization are targeted to the idea,
namely, the c in (v; c) : In contrast, the university invests a ow of funds to turn up a
random sequence of abstract ideas (investment opportunities). Ideas are random in both
their timing, and in their value and costs (v; c).
More particularly, I assume that if the university invests a ow of funds x; ideas for
commercial investment emerge at a Poisson rate  (x), where  is an increasing function.
Because each idea yields expected social value  () ; the ow of social value created is
 (x)  () dt and the ow of costs is xdt: Thus, consumer welfare can be written as the
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following function of (x; ):
W (x; )  1
r
[ ()  (x)  x] (3)
Let (x; ) be the maximizers of (3). Thus,  is the maximizer of  () ; and x is the
consumer-optimal level of spending on idea generation. It satises4
 () 0 (x)  1 = 0 (4)
The optimum cannot be achieved directly because R&D spending is not directly under
the control of the social planner. In the next three section, the planner is assumed to have
di¤erent tools for encouraging e¢ cient investment.  is the protability of developing ideas,
under the control of both a tax credit and a patent life. I will understand that the patent
life and tax subsidy (T () ;  ()) are chosen as the optimal way to achieve . For generating
ideas, I will consider two di¤erent policy instruments: direct subsidies (sections 3 and 4)
and matching subsidies (section 5).
When ideas are patentable, both the direct subsidy to the university and the tax credit
 to developers are valuable to the university. High tax credits will be passed through to
the university as high licensing fees.
I will use the term Bayh-Dole prots for the net revenues that arise from the universitys
development activities, namely ()  (x) ; where  is the reward parameter for developed
ideas, and x is the rate of R&D spending in the university.
3 Subsidies that Prime the Pump
Let b represent the universitys contribution to research expenditures, funded from Bayh-
Dole prots, and let s represent the subsidy. Total research spending is s + b: I assume
that the research division of the university must balance its budget. After paying any levy
imposed by the university, it must still cover its own R&D expenditures from the sum of
4The optimal level of research is lower if there is a cost to raising public funds. If the cost of raising one
dollar for the direct subsidy were k > 1; then the rst order condition for the optimal level of funding xk
would satisfy  () 0
 
xk

= k > 1, assuming the marginal research dollar is provided through subsidy.
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Bayh-Dole prots and subsidies. The budget constraint can be written as follows, where t
is a levy imposed by the university for its general fund:
(1  t) ()  (b+ s)  b = 0 (5)
This formulation takes seriously that Bayh-Dole prots are a tempting target for cash-
strapped universities, and there is no reason the funds need to be returned to the research
process. I assume that t  0: The research division cannot be a net drain on the rest of the
university.
Write  (s; t) for the universitys maximum feasible expenditure on research, namely,
the maximum value of b that satises the research divisions budget constraint (5). For
t = 0;  (s; 0) is the entire Bayh-Dole prot. If there is a levy, the Bayh-Dole prot is
()  ( (s; t) + s) ; which is divided between the general fund and the research enterprise,
according to the levy.
The function  also depends on ; but I will assume that  is optimally chosen, and avoid
the more complicated notation. The following assumption implies that (5) has a unique
solution except when s = 0; and then we take  (0; t) to be the positive solution rather than
zero.
Assumption 1:  is a strictly concave, increasing function such that  (0) = 0 and
lim
x!0
0 (x) ! 1
lim
x!1
 (x)
x
= 0
Assumption 1 ensures that  (b) is larger than b for small b and smaller than b for large
b: Thus, (1  t) ()  (b+ s) crosses the diagonal in gure 2. The research division spends
a budget of (1  t) ()  (b+ s)+ s: Assumption 1 ensures that all the objective functions
considered in this paper are strictly concave.
The university chooses the levy t. For the moment I will assume that this choice is
the primitive reection of the universitys preferences. In the next section I will assume
that the universitys levy is an endogenous consequence of more primitive preferences. The
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bUniversity contribution, b, β
(1-t)П(ρ) θ(b+s)
(1-t)П(ρ) θ(b)
β(0,t,ρ) β(s,t,ρ)
Figure 2: When t is xed, direct subsidies prime the pump
distinction will be of consequence because it a¤ects the timing of the game between gov-
ernment sponsors and the university. If the levy is xed as a primitive, it is not a¤ected
by subsidies. If the levy is endogenous, it can be adjusted to the subsidy according to the
universitys preferences. In section 5, where I consider matching subsidies, the research
divisions budget constraint is allowed to hold as an inequality (the Bayh-Dole prot after
paying the universitys research contribution can be positive), and the universitys levy is
positive residual.
Now consider how the universitys spending on research responds to subsidies when the
universitys levy is xed.
Figure 2 shows the universitys spending when the direct subsidy is 0 and when the direct
subsidy is some s > 0; namely  (0; t) and  (s; t).  (0; t) is described by the intersection of
the curve (1  t) ()  (b) with the diagonal, and  (s; t) is described by the intersection of
()  (b+ s) with the diagonal. Assumption 1 ensures that the intersection in each case
is at a positive level of spending.
Figure 2 shows that, provided the universitys levy, t; is xed, an increase in s will cause
the universitys spending  to increase. This answers the question whether subsidies crowd
out university spending or increase it. When the levy is xed, public subsidies prime
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the pump.Subsidies have both a direct e¤ect and indirect e¤ect on idea generation. The
indirect e¤ect is that the subsidy leads to protable ideas that feed more money into the
universitys budget, allowing the university to increase its spending on research even more.
However, as we will see below, "prime the pump" arises because the university chooses
the levy rate before the sponsor makes its subsidy commitment. In the next section, the
timing is reversed. The university chooses the levy after the subsidy has been set, and
"prime the pump" disappears except when the university chooses a levy of 0. Instead we
will see crowding out.
Proposition 1 .
(a) [Priming the pump with direct subsidies] Given the levy t; an increase in the direct
subsidy to the university, s; will cause total spending on research to increase by more than
the increase in the subsidy. That is,
@
@s
[ (s; t) + s] =
(1  t) () 0 ( (s; t) + s)
1  (1  t) () 0 ( (s; t) + s) + 1 > 1
(b) [Reducing spending by taxing it]Given the subsidy s; an increase in the levy t will reduce
university spending on research, that is,
@
@t
 (s; t) =
 ()  ( (s; t) + s)
1  (1  t) () 0 ( (s; t) + s) < 0
The proof consists of di¤erentiating the budget constraint (5).
The intuition for "prime the pump" is simply that the subsidy results in ideas that can
become protable innovations, and the prot from the innovations is again fed into the
idea-generating process.
Now consider the optimal subsidy policy. I assume that the sponsors objective is to
maximize (3), the consumer welfare provided through innovation. To accomplish that, the
optimal innovation policy (s; ) must satisfy
s+  (s; t) = x (6)
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university spending on R&D
Є (ρ*) θ(b)
(1-t) П(ρ*) θ(b)
xp x*
β(0,0,ρ*)
Figure 3: R&D spending for maximum prot, maximum consumer welfare and budget
exhaustion
However, gure 3 shows that the university might invest more in research than is
consumer-optimal, even if the subsidy is zero. In gure 3, when the direct subsidy is
s = 0; the university spends  (0; t), shown where (1  t) ()  (b) intersects the diagonal.
The consumer-optimal level of R&D spending is shown as the value x that satises (4).
The prot maximizing level of expenditure is xp which satises
xp = argmax [ ()  (x)  x]
It will hold that xp < x because () <  () : University spending  (0; t) is larger than
both x and xp in gure 3. This shows that, even without direct subsidies, developing ideas
can be so protable that the university overspends on generating ideas. This problem is
worse when development is very lucrative, that is, () is large, but is alleviated when
the university imposes a high levy on Bayh-Dole prot. In the next section I consider the
possibility that the university can change its levy.
4 Subsidies that Crowd Out University Spending
In the previous section, I assumed that the universitys levy was xed as an expression of
the universitys preferences, and that the sponsors subsidy was chosen afterwards. I now
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reverse the timing. I assume that the subsidy is announced, and then the university chooses
t by maximizing a utility function. The subsidy considered in this section is a grant that
is not contingent on the universitys own contribution. In the next section, I compare with
subsidies that are only available as matching grants to the universitys contribution.
Because the Bayh-Dole act allows the university to prot from its research, the question
arises whether the university will end up maximizing prot. The answer depends on how
much value the university places on dollars diverted to the general fund, and how much
value it places on research dollars.
To preview the results, if the university only values the general fund, it will want to
maximize prot. The research division is viewed only as a money machine, and all the
Bayh-Dole prots will be taxed away. On the other hand, if the university only values the
dollars spent in research, then all prot will be returned to the research process in order to
"prime the pump" for even more research. The total research spending will be greater than
the level that maximizes prot, but this could be good for consumer welfare, since xp < x:
If the university values both types of expenditure, but places more value on the general
fund than on research spending, some of the prot will be taxed away, and the university will
target a level of research spending that is larger than the prot-maximizing level. Because
the university sets a target level of spending, subsidies will crowd out the use of Bayh-
Dole prots. Subsidies cannot increase R&D spending unless the sponsor is already paying
the entire research budget, so that further crowding out is not possible. Paying the entire
research budget seems to defeat one of the benets of the Bayh-Dole Act, namely, to make
the universitys research budget self-funding.
Let m  1 be the value that the university places on each dollar of Bayh-Dole income
that is diverted to the universitys general fund, and suppose that dollars spent on research
are valued at par. Thus m expresses the universitys preferences. With the preferences m
xed and the subsidy s already chosen by the government sponsor, the university chooses its
levy on the Bayh-Dole prots, t (s;m), to maximize its utility. In doing this, it predicts the
e¤ect of the levy on the research divisions expenditures, according to the research divisions
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budget constraint (5).
When the university contributes b to research spending and the sponsor contributes s;
the university also gets ()  (b+ s) ; which I will call the Bayh-Dole prot. The subsidy
s must be spent on research, and the research division must not spend more than it takes
in from subsidies and Bayh-Dole prots. This is implied by the budget constraint (5).
The universitys objective function is
Um (t; s)  mt()  (b+ s) + (1  t) ()  (b+ s) + s (7)
= [(m  1) t+ 1] ()  (b+ s) + s
where b is constrained by (5).
This objective function, like the objective function in section 4, includes the research
expenditure as a benet as well as a cost. Research spending is a proxy for the amount of
research that is done, which the university values. Because research expenditures count as
a benet, the university may target a higher level of research spending than is optimal for
consumer welfare, and considerably higher than maximizes prot.
Let t (s;m)  0 be the optimizer of the universitys objective function, the optimal
levy. The levy cannot be negative, that is, there cannot be "reverse" transfers from the
general fund to the research budget. (For example, the universitys core budget might come
from tuition designated to support teaching or from funds designated for student-oriented
programs.)
I rst comment on two special cases, and then develop the general case. The two special
cases are, rst, that the university places equal weight on research spending and on the
general fund (m = 1), and second, that the university sees the research enterprise only as a
money machine, and does not value research for its own sake (m!1):5
5 I do not consider separately the possibility that m < 1; because the universitys choices are the same
as when m = 1: With m = 1; the university would already like to transfer money from the general fund to
the research budget, but I assume that is impossible. Such reverse transfers are even more tempting when
m < 1:
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4.1 What if the university values research and the general fund equally?
Whenm = 1; the universitys objective is simply to maximize prot U1 = ()  ( (s; t) + s)
by choice of t (s; 1) : Given s; the university will choose the levy that results in the highest
research spending  (s; t) : Since  (s; t) decreases with the levy, it follows that t (s; 1) = 0:
The university will not tax the research enterprise at all. This implies, using Proposition
1(a), that government subsidies to R&D again have the e¤ect of priming the pump. Higher
subsidies lead to an increase in R&D spending that exceeds the increase in the subsidy.
Spending is constrained only by the subsidy and the Bayh-Dole prots, and the university
wants it to be as high as possible.
4.2 What if the university does not value research?
Suppose instead that the university only values the general fund. This will cause the
university to maximize prot instead of R&D spending. Dividing the objective function
Um by m; and letting m!1; the universitys objective becomes
U1 (t; s) = t()  ( (s; t) + s)
Using the research divisions budget constraint (5),
()  (b+ s)  b = t()  (b+ s)
 ()  ( (s; t) + s)   (s; t) = t()  ( (s; t) + s)
Maximizing the righthand side is the same as maximizing the lefthand side, and because
s is xed, maximizing the lefthand side is the same as maximizing
()  ( (s; t) + s)  [ (s; t) + s]
If possible, the social planner will choose t (s;1) such that prot is maximized, namely
 (s; t (s;1)) + s = xp:
If s > xp; it is not possible to achieve the spending level xp, because the university must
spend the subsidy on research. However, the university will choose t (s;1) = 1; and thus
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send all the remaining prot to the general fund. The subsidy is still greater than the level
that maximizes prot.
However, if s < xp; the university will choose the tax rate so that the R&D spending is
topped up to the prot-maximizing level, xp:
Notice that there will be "crowding out" when s < xp: If the sponsor increases the
subsidy (but still below xp), the total spending on R&D will stay xed at xp. The university
will decrease its own R&D contribution to o¤set any increase in the subsidy. It will do this
by increasing the levy t (s;1) that diverts Bayh-Dole prots to the general fund. The
subsidy crowds out the universitys own spending. If the sponsor wants the university to
spend more than xp; it will have to pay the entire research budget, s > xp:
4.3 The general case
Now consider the general case where m 2 (1;1) : If m > 1; the university gets more welfare
from money diverted to the general fund than from money spent in research, but it values
both uses of funds. As we saw in the two special cases, the university is caught between
maximizing prot, which is the goal if it only values the general fund, and maximizing
research expenditures, which is the goal if it only values research. These intermediate
preferences may cause the university to divert Bayh-Dole prot, similarly to the extreme
case where m ! 1: The university realizes that by diverting funds, it reduces the total
amount of Bayh-Dole prot, because there is less "prime the pump" e¤ect.
The sponsor sets the subsidy s; and then the university sets its levy, t (s;m) : The
levy determines how much the university contributes to research from Bayh-Dole funds. It
contributes 100% when t (s;m) = 0 and nothing if t (s;m) = 1. In setting the subsidy, the
sponsor predicts the universitys levy, which I will begin by describing.
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The derivative of the universitys utility function Um is
d
dt
Um (t; s) = (m  1) + [(m  1) t+ 1]0t
=

(1  t) 0  1 (m  1) (1  t)0   1+ [(m  1) t+ 1]0
=

1  (1  t)0 m 0   1+ 1
Recall that  is the portion of Bayh-Dole funds returned to the research division, implied
by the budget constraint (5). Its derivatives are given in Proposition 1.
The rst-order condition for the optimal t (s;m) can be written
  1 () 0 ( (s; t (s;m)) + s)+ 1
m
 0 if t (s;m) = 0
= 0 if t (s;m) 2 (0; 1)
 0 if t (s;m) = 1
(8)
The value xm that satises (9) with equality will be called the universitys target level
of spending:
() 0 (xm) = 1  1
m
(9)
If there is a tax rate t (s;m) such that  (s; t (s;m)) + s = xm, this is the level of spending
it will choose.
For all m > 1; the target xm is larger than the level of spending that maximizes prot
(Proposition 2(a)). Intuitively, this is because research expenditures are valued as a benet
as well as a cost they are a proxy for research outputs. As we have seen, if the university
did not value research expenditures at all, it would target the prot-maximizing level of
research expenditure, and divert all additional prots to the general fund.
The university cannot always achieve the target. If s is very low, so that s+ (s; 0) < xm;
the university has less budget available than xm (Proposition 3(a)). Moreover, if the subsidy
is higher than the target and if (as I assume) the university cannot divert the subsidy itself
to other uses, the university will have to spend more than the target. All Bayh-Dole prots
will be crowded out, that is, diverted to other uses, which means t (s;m) = 1 (Proposition
2(c) and Proposition 3(c)). This will turn out to be a good thing, not a bad thing, because
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it enables the sponsor to increase spending above the universitys target, which could be
too low.
Say that it is feasible to achieve the target xm with a subsidy s if s  xm and s+ (s; 0) >
xm: As I have just pointed out, if the subsidy were higher than the target, the university
would have to spend more than the target. The condition s+ (s; 0) > xm implies that there
is enough Bay-Dole prot to ll the gap between the subsidy and the target. In particular,
there is a tax rate t (s;m) such that s+  (s; t (s;m)) = xm: This is Proposition 2(b). The
higher subsidy crowds out Bayh-Dole prots without increasing the level of spending above
xm:When the subsidy increases, the levy increases to hold the rate of spending xed at the
target.
Proposition 2 describes how the universitys total spending responds to the subsidy, and
the levels of spending that can be achieved. Proposition 3 restates these conclusions in
terms of the levy that the university will charge.
Proposition 2 (The universitys target level of spending, and crowding out) . (a)
The universitys target level of spending satises xm > xp, decreases with m and converges
to xp as m!1:
(b) [Crowding Out] If it is feasible to achieve the target xm with the subsidy s; the univer-
sity spends xm and ll the gap between s and xm with Bayh-Dole prots. A higher subsidy
crowds out Bayh-Dole prots one-for-one.
(c) [Full crowding Out] Given m if s > xm; the university spends s, and t (s;m) = 1: All
the Bayh-Dole prots are crowded out.
(d) For any x < min f (0; 0) ; xmg there is no subsidy such that the university will spend x:
(e) For any x  min f (0; 0) ; xmg there is a subsidy such that the university will spend x:
Proof : (a) It follows from concavity of  that xm decreases with m: Prot ()  (x) x
is maximized when () 0 (xp)   1 = 0 Because 0 is decreasing, it follows that xm > xp:
Further, as m!1; the two rst order conditions coincide, so xm ! xp:
(b) If the subsidy s is less than the target xm; then according to (8) and (9), the university
will ll the gap with Bayh-Dole prots: xm =  (s; t (s;m))+s = (1  t (s;m)) ()  (xm)+
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s; so xm   s = (1  t (s;m)) ()  (xm) :
(c) Because the universitys prot function is strictly concave, the objective function has
a higher value if the level of spending is moved closer to the target. If  (s; t (s;m)) > 0;
the university is spending s+  (s; t (s;m)) : The spending is closer to the target xm if
 (s; t (s;m)) = 0; which entails choosing t (s;m) = 1:
(d) With no subsidy and keeping all the Bayh-Dole Prot, the university does not have
enough money to reach the target. 
Proposition 3 restates these results in terms of the optimal levy, as the levy depends on
the subsidy.
Proposition 3 (The optimal levy) .
(a) Given m; if s +  (s; 0) < xm; the universitys optimal levy satises t (s;m) = 0, all
Bayh-Dole prots are used for research, and the universitys R&D spending falls short of
the target.
(b) For subsidies s such that it is feasible to reach the target xm, the universitys levy
satises t (s;m) 2 (0; 1), so that part of the research is paid for by Bayh-Dole prots, and
the university spends xm on research.
(c) For subsidies s > xm; the universitys levy satises t (s;m) = 1, the university spends s
in research, and none of the research budget is paid for from Bayh-Dole funds.
The important implication of Proposition 3 is that, if the sponsor wants to achieve the
consumer-optimal level of spending x; there are three possibilities:
1. The university wants to spend more than the sponsor wants to spend, and can
generate at least enough Bayh-Dole prot to reach the sponsors target. That is,
x < min fxm;  (0; 0)g : Then there is no point in providing subsidies. Spending will
be higher than the sponsor prefers in any case, and will be funded from Bayh-Dole
prots. There is no way to reduce spending.
2. The university wants to spend more than the sponsor wants to spend, but cannot
generate enough funds to reach the sponsors target x. That is,  (0; 0) < x  xm:
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Then the sponsor will provide a subsidy s that satises  (s; t (s;m)) + s = x and
t (s;m) = 0:
3. The university wants to spend less than the sponsor wants to spend, that is, xm < x:
Regardless of how much Bayh-Dole prot is available, the sponsor must fund the entire
research budget, x. The Bayh-Dole prots are crowded out. If the subsidy were less
than xm, the university would spend enough Bayh-Dole prots to reach xm; but not
more. For any subsidy greater than xm; the university will not spend any Bayh-Dole
prots on research.
Thus,
Proposition 4 (Crowding Out) Suppose the university can adjust its internal levy ac-
cording to the subsidy provided. Despite crowding out, the sponsor can increase research
spending in two circumstances: (1) if the university wants more spending than the sponsor
wants, but Bayh-Dole prots are not large enough to fund the sponsors target, and (2) if
the sponsor wants more spending than the university wants. In the case (1), the sponsor
can reach its target with no crowding out. The research is funded jointly from Bayh-Dole
funds and subsidies. In the case (2), the sponsor can reach its target, but with complete
crowding out. The subsidy must fund the entire research budget.
Of the two possibilities, the second might be the more likely, since the sponsor will
typically want to achieve the consumer-optimal level of spending x:
5 Matching Subsidies
So far I have supposed that the university can impose a levy on Bayh-Dole prots, and
I have considered the optimal subsidy policies in the two cases that the university can or
cannot change its levy to reect the subsidy. In both cases, the university might overspend
on research, relative to the spending level that maximizes consumer welfare, and in the
second case, there is a problem of crowding out.
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I now suppose that the sponsor can protect itself from crowding out by making the sub-
sidy contingent on matching. Matching mitigates the problem of crowding-out by denition,
since a specied portion of the research budget must be paid by the university. Although
matching is generally not imposed by the U.S. federal government or by grant-giving foun-
dations, it often occurs when prot-maximizing rms sponsor university research in return
for intellectual property rights and control rights. For that situation, Maurer and Scotch-
mer (2004) (see also Scotchmer 2004, Ch. 8) concluded that matching can lead to better
selection of projects. In this paper, however, the sponsor will not receive the intellectual
property and does not want the control rights. Matching will therefore serve a di¤erent
purpose, in particular, to avoid crowding out.
Let the sponsors matching rate be   0: The sponsor will provide matching funds
s = b when the university provides research funds b: To get a large subsidy, the university
must commit a lot of its own funds. The university then spends s + b = b (1 + ) on
research, and earns prot Bayh-Dole prot ()  (b (1 + )). The university can either
use the Bayh-Dole prot for research or divert it to the general fund. The amount that is
diverted to the general fund is ()  (b (1 + ))  b. Thus, the universitys levy is modeled
implicitly according to the portion of Bayh-Dole prots that are not used for research.
The objective function of the university is to maximize
Um (b; )  m [ ()  (b (1 + ))  b] + (1 + ) b (10)
= m()  (b (1 + )) + (1 +   m) b
subject to
()  (b (1 + ))  b  0 (11)
The maximum possible Bayh-Dole prot is the b that satises (11) with equality. I will
use  () for the solution to (11) as an equality. When the constraint holds as an inequality,
the university is making less prot than would be possible if it gave all the prot back to
research, and is also diverting some of the prot to other uses. Compare with (5), which
holds as an equality. The levy of the university is modeled explicitly as a tax.
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By Assumption 1, the prot surplus ()  (b (1 + ))   b is positive for b near zero,
decreasing with b, and negative for large enough b; similarly to what is shown in gure 3.
(Figure 3 is not drawn for the case of matching funds, so there is no :)
Now let bm () be the unconstrained maximizer of (10), and take bm () (1 + ) as the
universitys target for research spending. If the inequality (11) is satised at bm (), the
university will spend bm () : Otherwise, the university will be constrained by the maximum
Bayh-Dole prot,  () ; and its actual spending will be less than the target, bm () (1 + ).
Thus, the universitys spending on research is (1 + )min

bm () ;  ()
	
:
Several aspects of the universitys R&D decision are apparent simply by inspecting its
objective function.
First, the mere fact of matching mitigates the problem of crowding out. The university
pays a share 1= (1 + ) :
Second, matching funds can be so attractive that the university spends the entire budget
on research, including both Bayh-Dole prot and the subsidy. If 1 +   m > 0; then the
derivative of Um with respect to b is positive for all b, and the university will spend all the
Bayh-Dole prot,  () ; on research. Conditional on ; total spending is thus  () (1 + ) :
If 1+ m < 0; the university might choose a target less than  () (1 + ) ; and to achieve
it, might divert some of its Bayh-Dole prot to the general fund.
Third, as in section 4, there is a natural reason that the university might overspend on
R&D, even without subsidies. The university gets two types of benet from spending on
R&D. Not only is the university rewarded with Bayh-Dole prot, but it also gets utility
from the research expenditures directly. Research expenditures are a proxy for the fame
that comes with research outputs. These two benets of R&D spending show up in the
objective function Um, where the cost term,  b; is o¤set by the term that reects the
benets of spending on research, and thus vanishes completely when m = 1:
Proposition 5 now describes how the total spending on R&D depends on the matching
rate ; and therefore describes how the sponsor can inuence total R&D spending. The
universitys "target" now changes with  as well as m: Compare with the previous section,
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where the target depended only on the preference parameter m:
Taking the derivative of Um, the universitys unconstrained research target bm () is
described by
d
db
Um (bm () ; ) = m

() 0 (bm () (1 + )) (1 + )  1+ (1 + )
d
db
Um (bm () ; )
= 0 if bm () <1
 0 if bm () =1
(13)
The target bm () = 1 is obviously unachievable. The university would like to spend
innite resources on research when m < (1 + ) because the derivative (13) is positive for
all values of b. However, spending is constrained by the budget constraint (11), which
describes the maximum Bayh-Dole prots,  (). When m is relatively low, the university
does not place very much weight on diverting prot to the general fund, and keeping the
prots within the research budget has a "prime the pump" e¤ect.
If m > (1 + ) ; the target bm () might or might not exceed the Bayh-Dole prots given
by (11). If not, some of the universitys research income will be diverted to the general
fund. Research spending will stop at the point where the universitys valuation of an extra
dollar in research (accounting for the fact that it attracts matching funds and then generates
income) is just equal to the universitys valuation of that dollar placed in the general fund.
Proposition 5 characterizes how the sponsor can use the matching rate to govern the
universitys rate of spending.
Proposition 5 (The universitys R&D spending with matching) .
(a) Let x < min

bm (0) ;  (0)
	
: Then there is no   0 such that the university spends x
in research.
(b) Let x > min

bm (0) ;  (0)
	
: Then there exists   0 such that the university spends x
and the cost is funded partly out of Bayh-Dole prots.
(c) For all   0 and m  1; the universitys spending (1 + )minbm () ;  ()	 exceeds
the prot maximizing level, xp; but decreases with m and converges to xp as m!1:
(d) When m  1 + ; the university spends all its Bayh-Dole prot on research, namely,
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 () : If m > 1 + ; the university may divert some of the Bayh-Dole prot to the general
fund.
Proof : (a) Both (1 + ) bm () and (1 + )  () are increasing in ; and therefore x <
min

bm (0) ;  (0)
	
< (1 + )min

bm () ;  ()
	
: This means that at any matching rate ;
the university is both able and willing to spend more than x: (b) For su¢ ciently large ;
m < 1 + ; and the derivative of Um is positive for all levels of spending. The univesity
will spend as much resources as in research as are available, and therefore the universitys
spending will be entirely determined by its Bayh-Dole prots. The Bayh-Dole prots can
be made arbitrarily large by choosing  arbitrarily large.
(c) The prot maximizing value xp and the target bm () (1 + ) satisfy the following
respectively
() 0 (xp)  1 = 0 (14)
() 0 (bm () (1 + ))  1 + (1 + )
m
 0 with equality if bm () <1
Due to concavity of ; these two rst-order conditions imply that bm () (1 + ) > xp for
  0: However, as m ! 1; the two rst-order conditions in (14) coincide. Since the
objective functions are strictly concave, and there is a single level of spending where the
rst-order condition is satised, this proves that bm () (1 + ) ! xp for each  Finally,
to see that the expenditure is nonincreasing with m; it is enough to show that bm () is
nonincreasing with m: But this also follows from (13).
(d) I argued in (b) that when m  1 + ; the university will spend as much as it has
available from Bayh-Dole prots. I argued in (c) that for large m; bm () (1 + ) is close
to xp; the prot-maximizing level of spending. But at xp; there is positive prot not used
in research, ()  (bm () (1 + ))  bm () (1 + ) > 0; so some of the Bayh-Dole prot is
available for the general fund. 
I now compare matching to the noncontingent subsidies of the last section. Is matching
a better subsidy scheme? First, can it correct ine¢ ciencies that might arise with noncon-
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tingent subsidies? Second, can it reduce the degree to which Bayh-Dole prots are diverted
to uses other than R&D spending? These are answered in the following proposition, which
says that the schemes are equivalent in the levels of research spending they can achieve, but
matching can increase the use of Bayh-Dole prots for research.
For a given spending level x, say that the sponsor can achieve x if there is a noncontingent
subsidy, s; or matching rate, ; respectively, that induces the university to spend x in
research. I consider all values of x for completeness. The x that maximizes consumer
welfare can be larger or smaller than the universitys target. Any x above the target
can be achieved in both regimes, but will not be funded out of Bayh-Dole prots in the
noncontingent-subsidy regime. In this sense, the matching scheme is an improvement.6
Proposition 6 [Matching versus Noncontingent Subsidies] The same spending levels in the
university can be achieved with both noncontingent subsidies and with matching subsidies.
However, for large spending levels, the matching system has the added benet that part of
the spending is funded from Bayh-Dole prots.
Proof : For the case of noncontingent subsidies, Proposition 2 says that every level of
spending x can be implemented except x < min f (0; 0) ; xmg. For the case of matching,
Proposition 5 says that every level of spending x can be achieved except x < min

 (0) ; bm (0)
	
:
But it follows from the budget constraints (5) and (11) that  (0; 0) =  (0) and and it follows
from the rst order conditions (8) and (13) that xm = bm (0) : Hence, these are equivalent.

6 Should ideas be protectable?
Now suppose that ideas go into the public domain instead of being protected. There is a
longstanding theory, originating with Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) that because R&D
6 It might also be an improvement in another sense, if it is costly to raise public funds, that is, if k > 1 in
the sense of footnote 4. Bayh-Dole prots will be collected regardless of how they are spent, and a reduction
in funds from the general fund reduces the waste of collecting those funds. Of course this is a very partial-
equilibrium argument. It might not apply if total spending in the university is the same in both regimes,
with the sponsored portion simply shifting between the research division and the general fund.
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produces knowledge, and because knowledge is a public good, it should be produced with
public funds and made freely available. Although that theory was apparently rejected by
the framers of the Bayh-Dole Act, it still seems persuasive. I now investigate whether
consumer welfare would be higher in this model by embracing that theory.
Many ideas (v; c) will have value v=r much greater than the costs c of implementing
them. If such ideas were freely available, they would engender patent races. In contrast,
when ideas are protectable, patent races are avoided by auctioning exclusive licenses. Patent
races are ine¢ cient in this model because they entail duplicated costs.7 To avoid ine¢ cient
patent races, the reward should be reduced, by reducing the parameter : However, reducing
the prot available from commercialization has the deleterious e¤ect of eliminating some
ideas that should optimally be commercialized.
When ideas are not protectable, consumer welfare is given by the following, where
(1=r) () is subtracted from consumer welfare because rms in a race will dissipate the
entire prot. This is a waste of resources in expected amount (1=r) () :
W u (x; ) =
1
r
[ (x) ( () ())  x]
= W (x; )  1
r
 (x) ()
Because W u (x; ) < W (x; ) for any (x; ) ; consumer welfare would be higher with
protection of ideas than without protection if the same values of (x; ) could be implemented
in both regimes. However, that is not the case. The university is earning Bayh-Dole
prots when ideas are protected, but not otherwise. Thus, the spending levels x that are
implemented by a policy (s; ) will be di¤erent.
When ideas are not protected, the set of implementable spending levels is just the set
7A complexity of R&D is that the economy comprises di¤erent innovative environments. The core model
of the R&D literature is that investment opportunities are common knowledge, and that is what leads to
racing. I have always thought that premise to be awed, and in my 1999 paper, began to work on a model,
extended here, where investment opportunities (ideas) are scarce. Because they are not common knowledge
, ine¢ cient races are not a threat unless there is some mechanism by which the ideas become common
knowledge.
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of possible subsidies, which I will X u :
X u = R+
I do not need to consider the matching regime separately from the regime with noncon-
tingent subsidies, since the set of implementable spending levels is the same. However, I
consider that the universitys levy could be set before the subsidy or
after.The spending levels that can be implemented by policies (s; ) depend on ; since
the research division partly spends money earned through commercialization. I will refer
to these sets as X t () and X ~t () :
X t () = fx 2 R+ : x   (0; t)g
X ~t () = fx 2 R+ : x  max fxm;  (0; 0)gg
where the taste parameter is m, and xm is the target level of spending. The sets do not
refer to s; because the expenditures that can be implemented by all s are already included
in the sets as written. For example, in X t () ; if s > 0; then x = s+ (s; t) ; which is larger
than  (0; t), and also in the set X t () :
The only reason that protecting ideas might reduce welfare is that such protection
could generate too much spending on the generation of ideas. The spending rates that are
implementable are bounded below, due to the protability of commercializing the ideas.
However, overspending is not generally understood as the main problem, especially when
the university can tax away the prot from commercializations.
The following remark says in essence that as long as overspending is not a problem, it
is better to protect ideas than not to protect them.
Remark 1 (Protection of ideas as well as commercializations can be welfare enhancing)
Suppose that (x^; ^) maximizes W u and (x; ) maximizes W: Provided x^ 2 X t (^) and
x^ 2 X ~t (^) ; then W (x; ) > W u (x^; ^). It is better for consumer welfare to protect ideas
than not.
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7 Some reections on basic and applied research
The model in this paper contemplates that there are two research processes: a process that
turns up ideas or knowledge, and the innovation process that turns ideas into innovations.
The model turns up only an ambiguous reason for putting ideas in the public domain,
namely, to encourage patent races in the case that patent races are e¢ cient. However,
patent races might or might not be e¢ cient, and in this model, they are not.
Because the commercialization of each idea is protected, ideas are protable. Why then
does the ideas process need to be subsidized? The answer given above is that a pure prot
motive, such as one would expect from private rms and might even arise in the university,
will lead to underinvestment, which subsidies can cure.
It is tempting to interpret the ideas process in this model as "basic research". However,
there are no agreed-upon denitions of basic and applied research. The model here bears
little resemblance to the denition given, for example, by Nelson (1959), and expanded by
Pavitt (1990). Nelson dened basic research by its characteristics, perhaps most impor-
tantly, the degree to which the new knowledge can be appropriated. If basic research has
social value but no commercial value (that is, the social value cannot be appropriated),
then it is a short leap to the conclusion that basic research must be subsidized, and might
naturally take place in universities or public laboratories with grant support.
On closer inspection, the prot distinction between basic and applied research is shaky.
When a laboratory nds a drug target (but not the drug), is that basic research? If the
drug target is patentable, it has commercial value. Similarly, ideas in the above model have
commercial value if they are protected, but not otherwise. The commercial value is not
intrinsic to the technology, but rather to the legal rule. Appropriability cannot be used as
a denition of basic research because appropriability is a status of law, not a status of the
technology.
For this reason, I put appropriability aside, and turn to a second characteristic empha-
sized by Nelson, namely, whether the new knowledge is an input to the creation of further
knowledge. Such inputs might usefully be called "research tools", although that term is
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sometimes understood more narrowly than here. For my purposes, the knowledge that will
lead to future knowledge or products might or might not have a physical embodiment. It
might be a machine with multiple purposes, or it might be disembodied knowledge such
as how the body regulates division of cells. As a policy matter (and even in current legal
rules) both could be patentable.
I now comment on how the subsidy problem changes if universities are mainly in the
business of nding research tools, which are then licensed to commercial rms to develop
ideas not observed by the university/owner. In the model above, the ideas (investment
opportunities) generated by the university are observable to the university. In the case of
research tools, I assume the research tools generate investment opportunities, but the invest-
ment opportunities (ideas) are not observable to the university. This lack of observability
reduces the commercial prot that the university can collect, and also sties development
of some ideas that would otherwise be protable. For example, if the license involves xed
fees or royalties tied to the revenue stream, there will be some ideas with cost smaller than
total prot that will be lost because the licensor is collecting too much of the revenue, and
the developer cannot cover costs. The idea might not be developed even if it would generate
positive prot in total.
Thus, observability of the ideas determines how e¤ectively the research division can
prot from commercialization. If the investment ideas are known to the university and pro-
tected, they can be auctioned to developers. There is still a social burden due to monopoly
pricing of the commercializations, but there is no additional burden of inhibiting develop-
ment by charging royalties. If an idea is not very protable, it will still be developed, but
the winning bidder will not pay much for it.
In contrast, when the ideas are not observable to the licensor, the university cannot
auction them, the license terms cannot be tied to the cost of development, and in trying to
collect prot, the licensor will impose terms that also stie development of some ideas. This
is an argument for subsidizing the research tools and putting them in the public domain so
that the users do not need to license.
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8 Conclusion
Although the rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act was not to make university research self-
funding, administrators had such hopes, and many universities created licensing o¢ ces to
harvest the prot. However, I have argued that, due to crowding out, the Bayh-Dole prot
might not relieve scal pressure on the sponsors of research. Much of the prot could be
diverted to other activities.
I have assumed that universities and sponsors have di¤erent objectives. Universities
care about prots, but also care about research outputs, independently of the prot they
generate. Because universities value research for its own sake, they will target a higher
level of spending than maximizes prot, but perhaps less than is optimal from a consumer-
welfare point of view in the economy as a whole. I have assumed that sponsors of research
care about consumer welfare, and subsidizing the university is a vehicle to increase research
spending. Although the universitys spending target is higher than maximizes prot, the
target might still be lower or higher than is e¢ cient. If the target is already too high, there
is nothing the sponsor can do to reduce it. If the target is too low, the sponsor can increase
spending on research by giving subsidies, but up until the point where the subsidy exceeds
the target, the subsidy will only crowd out the use of Bayh-Dole prots while maintaining
a spending level equal to the universitys target. In order to increase spending above the
target, the sponsor must pay the entire research bill. Bayh-Dole funds will be used for
something else.
Crowding out occurs because the university adjusts its internal levy on Bayh-Dole prots
the more subsidy, the more tax. I also explored two aspects that mitigate the crowding
out. If universitys internal levy on Bayh-Dole prots cannot be adjusted according to the
subsidy, then subsidies "prime the pump." R&D spending increases not only because of the
direct e¤ect of the subsidy, but also because of the indirect e¤ect. The subsidy feeds ideas
that generate even more prot. Of course, since the levy is presumably informal, there is
no way for the sponsor to insist that it stay xed.
The other possibility is for the subsidies to be given on a matching basis. By deni-
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tion, the university and sponsor share the research budget in xed proportions, so there is
crowding out. To the best of my knowledge, the federal government does not give funds on
this basis, although private rms have been known to give funds on this basis.
Unlike other theoretical models of Bayh-Dole incentives, the model in this paper is fo-
cussed on institutional incentives rather than on the incentives of the individual researchers.
The model leaves aside another question of interest, which is whether the prot opportuni-
ties created by the Bayh-Dole Act divert researchers from more important pursuits. That
question does not arise in my model. Instead, this paper is concerned with the level of
spending on investment opportunities (ideas), and whether Bayh-Dole prot has the e¤ect
of topping up research budgets to increase total spending.
The key assumption is that the university has an incentive to tax the prots from
commercialization according to its preferences. This can nullify an apparent benet of the
Bayh-Dole Act, namely, to create a source of research funds. Due to crowding out, the
subsidies required to support research might be as high as when ideas are not patentable,
and the prots from commercialization will simply feed the university more generally.
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